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Rethinking the Capitalism/Slavery Question 
WALTER  JOHNSON 
What does it mean to speak of the "commodification of peo- 
ple" as a domain of historical inquiry? Why put it that way? What does 
it mean to say that a person has been commodified? Is this about slavery? 
Prostitution? Wage labor? The  sale of donated organs, fetal tissue sam- 
ples,  and sections  of the human genome?  Is it about the way that my 
personal data is sold without me knowing anything about it? Is it about 
the Coke machine in my kid's school cafeteria-the  sale of her unwitting 
little field of vision,  her tiny stomach,  and her enormous  desire  to be 
grown-up? At first glance, the phrase seems  impossibly  baggy: inviting 
all sorts of comparisons of the incommensurable, and posing  questions 
that sit at odd angles to the standard categories of historical inquiry. But 
perhaps  that's  the  point:  by  inviting  comparisons,  the  editors  have 
framed a question that draws attention to the connections and similarities 
between  historical processes  that are usually  analyzed as if  they were 
distinct-slavery,  wage labor, and prostitution,  say-and  calls attention 
to  the historically embedded  distinctions  that separate them  from one 
another as ethical, legal, and analytical subjects. 
In reflecting on these wonderful essays, I want first to review the older 
version of the question out of which this one seems to have been conju- 
gated: the question  of the relation of "capitalism" to  "slavery." And  I 
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want to do so with particular attention to the work of Karl Marx and the 
most  influential of those who  have written about slavery in the United 
States in orthodox Marxian terms; for it is, after all, this intellectual tradi- 
tion that has most actively kept alive the idea that when you  talk about 
"capitalism" and "slavery" you are talking about two things, rather than 
one.  Finally, I want to propose a heterodox reading of a short section of 
Capital  that foregrounds  the  question,  which  Marx so  insistently re- 
pressed throughout the rest of the text: the question of slavery. 
If it is hard to think about slavery as capitalism, that is because it is 
supposed  to be: slavery is, in some sense, "unthinkable" in the historical 
terms that frame western political economy.'  In both Smithian and Marx- 
ian economics,  slavery serves as an un-theorized historical backdrop to 
the history of capitalism, an un-thought (even when present) past to the 
inevitable emergence of the present. This  foundational exclusion of the 
fact of slavery from the framing of political economy,  I would argue, has 
had consequences  that bedevil us down to the present moment. 
James  Oakes recently has argued that Adam Smith and the "bour- 
geois" political economists  who followed him spent a great deal of time 
and energy trying to reconcile what everybody knew-that  slavery would 
inevitably give way  to "free" labor because of the superior capacity of 
self-interest as a tool of labor discipline-with  what seemed nevertheless 
to  be  everywhere  the stubborn fact: slaveholders were  making a great 
deal  of  money.  Smith  resolved  this problem,  according  to  Oakes, by 
passing it off to other regions of intellectual inquiry. Perhaps it was the 
"pride" of man that made "him love  to domineer," combined with the 
excessive  fertility of  the  tropics,  that accounted  for the persistence of 
slavery in  the  face  of  its  inherent  inefficiency and  inevitable decline.2 
Perhaps, that is, the persistence of slavery was a question to be answered 
by psychology  or geography (by moral philosophy  or natural history, to 
use terms Smith would recognize) but certainly not political economy. 
1. See, especially, Cedric  J. Robinson, Black  Marxism:  The Making  of the 
Black  Radical Tradition  (London, 1983). For  the idea of histories  "unthinkable" 
in the terms  of western  political  thought,  see Michel-Rolph  Trouillot,  Silencing 
the  Past:  Power  and the  Production  of History  (Boston, 1995); and Dipesh  Chak- 
rabarty,  Provincializing  Europe:  Postcolonial  Thought  and Historical  Difference 
(Princeton,  2000). 
2. James  Oakes,  "The Peculiar  Fate  of the Bourgeois  Critique  of Slavery,"  in 
Winthrop  D. Jordan  and Annette  Gordon-Reed,  eds., Slavery  and the  American 
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If Smith displaced the question of slavery, it might be said that Marx 
simply evaded it. The  magnificent critique of the commodity form with 
which Marx began Capital, for instance, unfolds from a detailed consid- 
eration of the nature of a bolt of linen. Out of the dual character of that 
linen as an object and a commodity-having  a use value and an exchange 
value-Marx  develops  the notion of "the fetishism of commodities,"  the 
habit of mind by which things are made to seem as if they exist in relation 
to one another (compared according to their prices) rather than to their 
uses  and  the  circumstances  of  their  production  (which  reflected  the 
larger matrix of social relations).? But wait: a bolt of linen? At a moment 
when  English mill hands expended  the (few) calories they gained from 
American sugar on the work of processing American cotton?4 Describing 
an economy that shipped sterling debt to the new world to pay for slave- 
grown  products  and  then  received  it  back again in  exchange  for the 
finished  textiles  produced  in  British  factories?5 In  the  shadow  of  a 
bloody  Civil  War in  which  the  Confederate  foreign policy  had  been 
premised on the (almost true) idea that the disruption of the cotton trade 
would  cause such suffering in England that the British would  be forced 
to support secession?6 A bolt of linen?7 
Marx's substitution of (British) flax for (American) cotton as the em- 
blematic raw material of English capitalism enabled him to tell what in 
essence was a story of the commodity form artificially hedged in by Brit- 
3.  Kark  Marx, Capital:  A Critical  Analysis  of Capitalist  Production  (3 vols., 
New York,  1967), 1: 43-87. For a reading  of Capital  that outlines  a helpful (if 
doxological)  set of interpretations,  see David  Harvey,  The  Limits  to Capital  (1982; 
rep., London, 1999). 
4.  See Sidney  Mintz,  Sweetness  and Power:  The  Place  of Sugar  in Modern  His- 
tory  (New York,  1985). 
5.  See Edwin J.  Perkins, Financing Anglo-American  Trade: The House of 
Brown,  1800-1880 (Cambridge,  MA, 1975). 
6.  See Frank  Lawrence  Owsley,  King Cotton  Diplomacy:  Foreign  Relations  of 
the Confederate  States of America  (Chicago, 1959), 134-53; Thomas Hietala, 
Manifest  Design:  Anxious  Aggrandizement  in Late Jacksonian  America  (Ithaca, 
1985), 55-94. 
7.  The substitution  of linen for cotton seems even more  remarkable  in light of 
the facts  that  Marx  was subsisting  during  the period  he wrote Capital  largely  on 
loans  from  Engels,  who was working  as the manager  of a cotton  mill  partly  owned 
by his family.  See Peter  Stallybrass,  "Marx's  Coat,"  in Patricia  Spyer,  ed., Border 
Fetishisms:  Material  Objects  in Unstable  Spaces  (London, 1998), 190-94. 302  *  JOURNAL  OF THE  EARLY REPUBLIC (Summer 2004) 
ish national boundaries. This unacknowledged spatial specificity surfaces 
again in  the chapter on  "primitive accumulation," which  provides the 
ground in which most of those seeking to apply Marxian historical cate- 
gories  to  the  story  of  American slavery have  rooted  their ideas.  The 
bloody story that Marx told in this chapter is of the expropriation of the 
commons  through the process  of enclosure  (the forcible imposition of 
private property on  the landscape  through the planting of hedges  and 
violent  enforcement of  exclusive  rights), which  prevented  the landless 
from providing for themselves in any way other than working for wages 
they would then use to pay for things they once had made (here specified 
as yarn, linen, and woolens).  "The expropriation and eviction of a part 
of the agricultural population,"  Marx explained,  "not only  set free for 
industrial capital, the laborers, their means of subsistence,  and material 
for labor; it also created the home market."8  With its emphasis on laws 
from  the  reign  of  the  Tudor  monarchs,  domestic  products,  and  the 
"home" market, this is an unabashedly provincial story. It is the story of 
feudalism succeeded  by capitalism in England, Anglo-centric in its spa- 
tial parameters and teleological in its temporal framing. 
And yet this is the section of Capital upon which historians of slavery 
have relied when they have attempted to situate their histories in that of 
capital. For among the very few remarks that Marx made about slavery 
he did include in the historical account of capitalism at the back of the 
book  the following amazing sentence: "The  veiled slavery of the wage- 
workers in Europe needed,  for its pedestal,  slavery pure and simple in 
the new world.""' 
Those  claiming the mantel of Marx have generally read this sentence 
according  to the framing of the material on European history that sur- 
rounds it, as if it makes a claim about historical development.  "Veiled 
slavery," of course,  refers to  the commodification  of labor power (the 
sectioning of the human body's capacities into time-scaled units of labor 
that can be  "freely" sold  on  the open  market) as opposed  to "slavery 
pure  and  simple,"  the  commodification  of  the  laborer (the  sale of  a 
human being at a price that made that person comparable to all manner 
of things). In the standard reading, this is the passage where Marx refers 
to the inevitable succession  of the latter by the former. Thus,  in answer 
8.  Marx,  Capital,  1: 667-712 (quotation  at 699). 
9.  Ibid., 711. Johnson,  THE  PEDESTAL AND  THE  VEIL  *  303 
to the question as it is commonly put-what  does Marx say about capital- 
ism and slavery?-there  can only be one answer: slavery in Marx is not, 
properly speaking, "capitalist." As  Elizabeth Fox-Genovese  and others 
have argued, in American slavery there was no separation of labor from 
the land; it was labor rather than labor power that was being commodi- 
fled; capital and labor did not stand in relation to one another counter- 
poised  by  contract  but  cohabited  in  the  same  exploited  body;  the 
domination of labor was not abstract but concrete, etc. According to the 
indicia of orthodox  Marxism (at least as it is represented by those who 
have invoked it to study slavery in the United  States), slavery was, like 
feudalism,  "pre-capitalist," "archaic," a  "conservative"  residuum;  its 
super-cession  by  "capitalism" (here  defined  as  an industrial mode  of 
production characterized by wage labor) was inevitable and its theoriza- 
tion beyond  that fact (for Marx at least) unnecessary.'0 So,  that's what 
(they say) Marx says about slavery. But what does slavery say about Marx? 
By attempting to frame the history of slavery within categories derived 
from writings that self-consciously treated slavery as a historical and con- 
ceptual backdrop for the main event-the  history of industrial capitalism 
in Europe-historians  writing as orthodox  Marxists have,  understand- 
ably, ended up in a bit of a mess. If slavery was not capitalist how do we 
explain its commercial character: the excrescence of money changers and 
cotton factors in southern cities who yearly handled millions and millions 
of  pounds  of  foreign  exchange;  the  mercantile ambitions  of  southern 
slaveholders who wanted to take over Cuba and Mexico  and Nicaragua 
so as to insure their commercial dominance and greatness; the thriving 
slave markets at the centers of their cities where prices tracked those that 
were being paid for cotton thousands of miles away? The  standard an- 
swer has been to say that slavery was "in but not of" the capitalist econ- 
omy, a beguilingly otiose formulation, which implies some sort of spatial 
10. See Eugene  D. Genovese,  The  Political  Economy  of Slavery:  Studies  in the 
Economy  and Society  of the Slave South  (New York,  1965); Elizabeth  Fox-Geno- 
vese and  Eugene  D. Genovese,  The  Fruits  of  Merchant  Capital:  Slavery  and Bour- 
geois Property  in  the Rise and Expansion of Capitalism  (New York, 1983); 
Elizabeth  Fox-Genovese, Within the Plantation Household:  Black and  White 
Women  of the Old South (Chapel  Hill, 1988). The temporal  unevenness  of the 
succession  story  is generally  smoothed  by the invocation  of the category  of "con- 
tradiction":  see Mark  V. Tushnet, The  American  Law of Slavery:  Considerations 
of Humanity  and Interest  (Princeton,  1981). 304  *  JOURNAL  OF THE  EARLY REPUBLIC (Summer 2004) 
unity of process  ("in") which it defines only negatively in relation to an 
orthodox definition of "capitalism."" 
The  existing discussion,  that is to say, has devolved into a set of more- 
or-less tautological propositions  about how you define the categories of 
historical analysis (if "capitalism" is defined as that-mode-of-production- 
characterized-by-wage-labor then slavery was, by definition, not "capital- 
ist"). But doesn't it make more sense to think about the political econ- 
omy of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Atlantic as a single space, 
its dimensions defined by flows of people,  money, and goods,  its nested 
temporalities set by interlocking (though clearly distinct) labor regimes, 
cyclical rhythms of cultivation and foreign exchange,  and shared stan- 
dards of calculability and measurement?'2 Try for just a minute to imag- 
ine the history of that bolt of cotton that Marx left out of Capital. It had 
been  bought  before  it  even  existed  by  a British buyer who  extended 
credit in sterling to an American factor. It had been put in the ground, 
tended, picked, bagged, baled, and shipped by an American slave. It had 
graded  out  well  and  brought a premium  price  because  it was free of 
"trash" (leaves, stems,  sticks, rocks, etc.)  and "stains" (which resulted 
from cotton being left in the field too long after it bloomed);  its condi- 
tion, that is, reflected the palpable presence of standards of the exchange 
in Liverpool in the labor regime that governed  Louisiana. It had been 
shipped  in the name of a planter who was thus liable for any difference 
between the price he had received in advance and the price for which it 
was  eventually sold-a  planter, that is,  who  was legally present at the 
exchange on which his cotton was sold.  It had been summed out in the 
accounts  between  planters and  factors in  dollars  that the  factors had 
bought with the sterling they had received from English buyers and sold 
to northern merchant bankers who would pass it on to those seeking to 
11. Fox-Genovese,  Within  the  Plantation  Household,  53-58. 
12. For  a reading  of Marx  that  dovetails  with my reading  of the political  econ- 
omy of the Atlantic  world, see David Kazanjian,  The Colonizing  Trick:  National 
Culture  and Imperial  Citizenship  in Early  America  (Minneapolis,  2003), 14-24. 
See also Stuart  Hall,  "Race,  Articulation,  and Societies  Structured  in Dominance," 
in Philomena  Essed and David  Theo Goldberg,  eds., Race  Critical  Theories:  Text 
and Context  (Oxford,  UK, 2002), 38-68. For the emphasis  on time, space,  and 
"calculation,"  see David  Harvey,  "Money,  Space,  Time, and the City,"  in his The 
Urban  Experience  (Baltimore,  1989), 165-99. Johnson,  THE  PEDESTAL AND  THE  VEIL  *  305 
buy  English  manufactures. And  had  been  finished  in  an English  mill, 
made into a coat, and ended up on the back of an English millhand who 
paid for it with his wages.13 
In trying to reframe the capitalism/slavery discussion  as a set of ques- 
tions  about  eighteenth  and  nineteenth-century  Atlantic political  econ- 
omy, it might be worth just  for a second  (because that is all it will take) 
to see what Marx did say about the history of slavery in Capital.  Right 
before the business about the veil and the pedestal he wrote this: "Whilst 
the cotton  industry introduced  child-slavery in England, it gave in the 
United States a stimulus to the transformation of the earlier, more or less 
patriarchal slavery, into a system of commercial exploitation."'14  What is 
striking about  this  sentence  is  the  first word:  "whilst."  It  frames the 
relation of what we  have been  calling "capitalism" and what we  have 
been calling "slavery" in terms of dynamic simultaneity rather than sim- 
ple super-cession,  though it does so with careful attention to the histori- 
cally different relations of production-slavery  and wage  labor-which 
characterized the two poles of this single Atlantic economy.  In so doing, 
it frames the pedestal metaphor that directly follows it as a structural (or 
spatial) metaphor rather than a temporal one.  Rather than focusing  on 
the specifics of capitalist development in Europe, this sentence treats the 
Atlantic economy  as its  ground  of  analysis,  a spatial unit  over which 
economic  practice  had  differential but  nevertheless  related forms  and 
effects. 
And the name that Marx gives this trans-Atlantic political economy  at 
this moment  very close  to  the  end  of  Capital  is  not  "capitalism" but 
"slavery"-"child-slavery,"  "veiled slavery," "slavery pure and simple." 
13. For  money  and  credit,  see Harold  Woodman,  King  Cotton  and His Retain- 
ers:  Financing  and Marketing  the Cotton  Crop  of the  South,  1800-1925  (Lexing- 
ton, KY, 1968), 3-198; and Perkins,  Financing  Anglo-American.  For  slaves,  labor, 
discipline,  and cotton,  see Walter  Johnson,  River  of Dark  Dreams:  Slavery,  Capi- 
talism, and Imperialism  in the Mississippi  River Valley  (forthcoming).  For the 
increasing  identification  of the English  working  class with cotton clothing, see 
Stallybrass,  "Marx's  Coat,"  193-94. 
14. Marx, Capital, 1: 711. Marx  also used the idea of "commercial  slavery" 
when  he compared  the interstate  slave  trade  in the United  States  to the importation 
of Irish  workers  to England:  "Mutato  nomine  de te  fabula narratur,"  he wrote: 
"with  the name  changed,  the story  applies  to you" (254). 306  *  JOURNAL  OF THE  EARLY REPUBLIC (Summer 2004) 
It would  strain credibility to argue that the hundreds upon hundreds of 
pages of Capital in which Marx ignored the question of slavery should 
be re-read in the light of the several moments at the end where he seemed 
to  suggest  that "slavery" was  the essential form of exploitation in  the 
nineteenth-century economy and that the forms it took in Manchester or 
in  Mississippi  were  simply variant manifestations of a shared essence. 
Safer to  understand  the  invocation  of  "slavery" as  a rhetorical effect, 
designed  to  pierce  the  illusion  that wage-workers were  in  any sense 
"free." "Slavery" was, after all, an often-invoked metaphor in the nine- 
teenth-century. The  term served  as a sort of universal comparison for 
disparate injustices, and in the process  it lost some  of its meaning and 
most  of its historical specificity.  But the very metaphorical promiscuity 
of the term "slavery" as Marx used  it, calls us to pay close  attention to 
both the pattern of its deployment and the maneuvers by which its seem- 
ingly universal applicability was contested and controlled. To pay atten- 
tion,  that is,  to  historical process  by  which  the  boundaries  between 
slavery and "freedom" were drawn, and to the character of the "veil" 
that separated them. 
The  "veil" to which Marx refers is most simply imagined as "contract 
freedom": the idea that wage-labor contracts (by which  "free" workers 
sold  control over  the capacities of  their bodies  by  the hour) reflected 
freely given "consent" to the bargain (and thus elided the deeper histor- 
ies of expropriation and coercion that, according to Marx, actually struc- 
tured the bargain).  '  It refers, that is, to the historical process by which 
the commodification of laborers and the commodification of labor power 
came to be  understood  as two  entirely separate and,  indeed,  opposite 
things-slavery  and  freedom, black and white,  household  and market, 
here and there-rather  than as two concretely intertwined and ideologi- 
cally symbiotic elements of a larger unified though internally diversified 
structure of exploitation. 
This  formulation of functional unity veiled by ideological  separation 
15. See David Brion Davis, The  Problem  of Slavery  in the  Age  of Revolution, 
1770-1823 (Ithaca,  1975);  David  R. Roediger,  The  Wages  of Whiteness:  Race  and 
the  Making  of the  American  Working  Class  (London,  1991);  and  Amy  Dru  Stanley, 
From  Bondage  to Contract:  Wage  Labor,  Marriage,  and the  Market  in the  Age  of 
Slave  Emancipation  (Cambridge,  UK, 1998). Johnson,  THE  PEDESTAL  AND  THE  VEIL  *  307 
entails several interesting avenues of inquiry taken up by these  essays. 
They  commend us, first, to try to think about the economies  of Europe, 
America,  Africa-so  long  divided  by  historiographies  framed around 
national boundaries  and  hard-and-fast distinctions  between  modes  of 
production-in  all of their concrete interconnection.16  This emphasis on 
the concrete and practical seems to me to have the virtue of allowing for 
the use of some  of the most powerful categories produced  by western 
political  economy-the  idea  of  commodification,  the  labor  theory  of 
value,  the notion  of variability (across  space  and  race) of  the socially 
necessary cost of the reproduction of the laboring class, and the calcula- 
tion  of surplus  value-without  having first to  engage  a long  doctrinal 
dispute about the capitalism question.  Once  the teleology  of the "slav- 
ery-to-capitalism" question  has been  set aside,  that is, we  still have an 
enormous amount to learn from what Marx had to tell us about the work 
of  capitalists as we  try to  diagram the historical  interconnections  and 
daily practices of the global economy  of the eighteenth  and nineteenth 
centuries. 
These  essays likewise suggest a second  set of topics as we try to think 
of the enormous work involved in categorizing and containing all of those 
interconnections in notions of process and history structured by the op- 
positions  of  slavery and  freedom,  black and white,  and  coercion  and 
consent.  As  they argued about where to draw the line between  proper 
and  improper  forms of  political  economy-about  whether  wage  work 
was wage slavery, whether slaveholding was slave trading, and whether 
marriage  was prostitution-capitalists  and anti-capitalists, employers and 
employees,  masters and  slaves,  husbands  and  wives  argued  over  the 
character of freedom, right, and personhood,  over where they began and 
where they ended,  where  these  things could  be  said to be  salable and 
where  they  must be  held  to be  sacred. These  violent  arguments were 
eventually settled  on a frontier where we  live today: "slavery" was de- 
fined by the condition of blacks in the South before 1865 and "freedom" 
was defined as the ability to choose  to work for a wage or a share of the 
crop (though not to choose not to work for a wage or a share of the crop 
16. See Eric Williams,  Capitalism  and Slavery (Chapel Hill, 1944); Mintz, 
Sweetness  and Power;  and  Joseph Miller,  Way  of Death:  Merchant  Capitalism  and 
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or, indeed, to choose not to be "free"), and "the household" was defined 
as "in but not of the market."•7  "So massive was the effort" wrote Marx, 
"to establish 'the eternal laws of Nature' of the capitalist mode of produc- 
tion."18  And  so  began  the  history  of  "freedom," which  is  apparently 
hurtling toward such a fearful conclusion  all over the world today. 
17.  See Daniel T.  Rodgers, The Work  Ethic in Industrial America, 1850-1920 
(Chicago,  1978);  Thomas  C.  Holt,  The Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor, and 
Politics in Jamaica  and Britain,  1832-1938  (Baltimore, 1992);  Stanley, From 
Bondage to Contract; Saidiya V.  Hartman, Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, 
and  Self-Making in  Nineteenth-Century America (New  York, 1997);  Kazanjian, 
The Colonizing Trick, 35-138. 
18.  Marx, Capital, 1:711. In the original: "Tantae molis erat  .. ." 